Supporting Information (For Online Publication)

How Migrating Overseas Shapes Political Preferences: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Contents

A Additional Information about the Experiment

Note: Some of the material in these appendices, particularly in Sections A-B, also appears in the appendices of: Gaikwad, Hanson, and Tóth (2025) and Gaikwad, Hanson, and Tóth (Forthcoming), which examine a different set of results from the same field experiment.

A.1 Intervention Location and Study Context

Figure A.1: Map of Mizoram, India

Mizoram is situated in northeastern India, bordering Bangladesh on the west and Myanmar on the east. The state is sparsely populated, with around one million residents. Aizawl, the

capital city, hosts a third of this population with 300,000 residents. Mizoram has a highly educated population: the literacy rate is 91.33 percent according to the 2011 Census. Female literacy is 89.27 percent, which puts Mizoram amongst the highest literacy and female literacy rates in India (India 2011). Mizoram also has one of the highest female-to-male demographic ratios as well as one of the lowest literacy gender gaps in the country (India 2011). While most people in Mizoram speak the local language, Mizo, English is also widely spoken and used as the other official language of the state. The vast majority of the state's population belong to various tribes that are collectively known as Mizos. These tribes have been classified under the Indian Constitution as Scheduled Tribes, a category indicating groups that have been historically marginalized and discriminated. Today, the Indian Constitution guarantees Scheduled Tribes quotas in government jobs, educational institutions, as well as elected positions. The majority of Mizos identify as Christians and only a small minority identifies as Hindus or Buddhists (Government of Mizoram 2014).

Mizos migrated to current Mizoram from upper Burma sometime between the 15$^{\text{th}}$ and 18$^{\text{th}}$ centuries (Government of Mizoram 2014). British colonization was formalized in 1895 after the Lushai Hills were declared to be part of British India. Mizoram administratively became a district of the province of Assam. This was also the time when Christian missionaries arrived to the area and set up schools. Missionaries achieved wide-reaching changes in Mizo society by converting the majority of the population to Christianity, opening schools, and educating the masses (Government of Mizoram 2014). After India's independence, Mizoram remained a part of the state of Assam, but centralized control from Assam frustrated Mizos and in the 1960s the Mizo National Front (MNF) started an armed insurgency. Mizoram became the 23$^{\text{rd}}$ state of India in 1986, following a peace accord between the Government of India and the MNF (Government of Mizoram 2014).

Subsequently, the MNF reformed itself as a political party and contested elections in 1987. The Indian National Congress (INC)—established in 1961—is the other major political party in the state (Government of Mizoram 2014). The INC and the MNF have regularly alternated in power in the state's legislative assembly. At the local level, after the abolition of chieftainship, village councils were established in 1957. Mizoram, as a Sixth Schedule state, is excluded from quotas instituted for women, Scheduled Castes, and Other Backward Classes (OBCs), in village councils under the 73$^{\text{rd}}$ amendment of the Indian constitution (Government of Mizoram 2014).

Despite its high human capital, Mizoram lacks employment opportunities. The relative geographic isolation and mountainous topography have constrained industrial growth and produced high unemployment rates. Mizoram's GDP per capita is around US$1,600, which puts it at 19$^{\text{th}}$ amongst 27 Indian states (Government of Mizoram 2014). The majority of the population remains employed in agriculture, even though the contribution of agriculture to GDP has been declining (Government of Mizoram 2014). Industrial output is only 19.39 percent of the state's GDP, whereas the tertiary sector makes up 66.29 percent of the GDP. The largest employer within the services sector remains the government. Taken together, Mizoram has struggled to create employment opportunities outside of small-scale agriculture and the public sector, which leaves its educated population without adequate employment opportunities.

Why focus on the India-GCC migration corridor? Much of prior research on migration has analyzed population flows from the Global South to the North, but migration across countries in the Global South has increased exponentially in the past twenty years. According to the 2017 United Nations Migration Report, migrants around the world are most likely to originate from Asia, which sends 41 percent of the world's migrant population (United Nations 2017). India alone sends 16.6 million migrants abroad making it the country with the largest number of emigrants in absolute terms. Furthermore, sasikumar2015gulf estimates that around 600,000–800,000 migrants leave India annually, whereas annually the country adds 7–8 million new workers to the labor force.

This makes out-migration one of the major sources of new employment for Indian workers.

Due to the role of economic incentives, social networks, and immigration policy regimes, migrants often end up in a small set of countries. Around 60 percent of Asian migrants, for instance, migrate to another Asian or Middle Eastern country, and only a much smaller subset, 16 and 19 percent, migrate to Europe and North America, respectively.[104] Moreover, the 2017 United Nations Migration Report estimates that more than 67 percent of the world's migrant population live in only twenty countries. Out of these twenty, Saudi Arabia has the second largest migrant population, the United Arab Emirates the eighth and Kuwait the twentieth. This has not always been the case. Countries outside of a small group of Western industrialized countries have been registering rapid growth in migrant populations only in the past twenty years (United Nations 2017). GCC countries are amongst the world's most significant migrant destinations today both in terms of volume and growth in migration.

When looking at migration flows between countries, Indian migration to the UAE is second only to the Mexico-US migration corridor (United Nations 2017). Migration between India and the Gulf, however, is growing much more rapidly. Migration between India and the UAE nearly tripled in the past twenty years, with migration from India to Saudi Arabia doubling within the same time period (United Nations 2017).

It is not only the size of migration within the Global South that warrants scholarly and policy attention, but also its economic impact. India is the largest recipient of overseas migrants' remittances, with US$78.6 billion received in 2018 (World Bank 2019). For comparison, India received US$44.37 billion in foreign direct investment. Over half of these remittances are sent from GCC countries by Indian migrants. For low or middle income countries, the size of these remittances often make up a significant portion of the economy. For India's northeastern neighbor, Nepal, remittances equal 28 percent of its gross domestic product (World Bank 2019). Unlike development assistance, remittances flow directly to recipient households making it an important source for consumption and investment.

An important difference between South-South migration and South-North migration is that many Western industrialized countries offer a route to citizenship, although they restrict labor migration flows tightly and often privilege educated and skilled migrants in the case of employment-based immigration. By contrast, countries in the Global South usually welcome labor migrants of varying skill levels, but make it very difficult for newcomers to obtain citizenship and permanent residency status. This means that most migrants return home after temporary work abroad in the case of South-South migration.

A.2 Recruitment Strategy

We identified and recruited a group of prospective candidates interested in migrating to GCC countries for employment, but lacking the know-how and connections to do so. We relied on a variety of different media to advertise the job training and placement opportunity. We posted advertisements in leading Mizo newspapers as well as on local Mizo television networks (specifically, Zonet and LPS). We sent recruitment materials and application forms to regional offices of local skills training organizations and visited job fairs organized by the government. One of the job fairs took place in a suburb of Aizawl, while the other one took place in a neighboring district's headquarter. Additionally, we placed banners around Aizawl advertising the program. Finally, we

[104]In absolute terms this means that out of 105 million Asian migrants in 2017, 63 million migrated within Asia, 20 million migrated to Europe, and 17 million migrated to North America.

reached out to the largest Mizo community organization, Mizo Zirlai Pawl (MZP) to advertise on their social media platforms. Advertisement materials were translated to Mizo to reach a wide audience. The advertisement period lasted for two months over the summer of 2018. While we targeted the entire state of Mizoram with our advertising strategy, the majority of applicants came from Aizawl, which was unsurprising given the higher educational attainment and English skills in the capital city.

All our advertising materials asked applicants to be above the age of 18 and have at least Grade 10 standard education. We also required English competency. Once registration for the program took place, our team in Aizawl called back all registered applicants and screened them for their English skills over the phone.

We randomly assigned treatment status using the final list of applicants who passed the English language screening. We matched these applicants into blocked pairs based on age, gender, education level, and English proficiency (judged in the English screening). We then randomized between each pair, assigning one to treatment and the other to control.

A.3 Survey Methodology

We were interested in examining the prospective effects of economic opportunity, as distinct from the effects of realized economic gains as well as the effects of migrating abroad, on our theoretical outcome variables of interest. Therefore, we interviewed subjects (both treatment and control) in three survey rounds: a baseline survey before participants were selected for the treatment, a midline survey after the training program for the treatment group had finished but before individuals secured jobs and began migrating abroad, and an endline survey after migration had occurred.

All surveys were administered by a New Delhi-based survey company (CVoter Inc.), that hired twenty local, Mizo-speaking male and female enumerators to conduct the surveys. This ensured that participants had access to enumerators of the same gender. The surveys were written in English and then translated into Mizo and back-translated into English by CVoter's team. We offered subjects the choice of Mizo and English versions of the survey. The topics that formed the basis of our surveys are socio-political topics that are routinely discussed in Indian society and that are identical or similar to questions that are commonly asked in many types of preexisting surveys, including government surveys (notably, the National Family and Health Surveys) carried out across India on a regular basis.

The baseline survey was a face-to-face survey that took place in Aizawl. Survey subjects were invited to the research team's offices in central Aizawl, where they were asked to fill out a survey by enumerators using handheld tablets. In order to facilitate re-contacting, we collected the phone numbers and addresses of each respondent as well as back-up family member contact information. Shortly after the baseline survey, we contacted our respondents via telephone to ensure that appropriate contact information had been given and to verify respondents' willingness to participate in future surveys.

After our training sessions were concluded, we fielded our second survey round. The survey was administered as a 30-minute computer assisted telephone interview (CATI) by CVoter enumerators. To boost participation, we offered phone credits worth a month of free calls, text messages, and 1 GB of data to participants for taking the survey.[105] The third survey was conducted about two years following the second survey round. This survey was administered as a 45-minute CATI survey fielded by CVoter enumerators. Respondents were offered cash incentives of 1,000 INR that were

[105]Depending on the telephone operator, this cost around 169–199 INR (US$2.36–2.78) per person.

deposited directly in their bank accounts.

A.4 Training and Recruitment Program

In this section, we provide further details regarding the treatment component related to the training program geared toward employment opportunities abroad. The training program was designed to equip individuals with the skills required to access employment opportunities overseas and overcome logistical barriers to migration. Individuals selected for the program had the opportunity to attend a five-week job training program designed to impart skills that would be useful in hospitality sector employment in GCC countries. Individuals were also informed that upon completion of the program, they would be contacted for employment opportunities by a recruitment firm partnering with the training program.

During the first half of the program, participants attended classroom training sessions administered by a Bangalore-based training firm, Free Climb. This component of the program included modules on restaurant food service, beverage and counter service, and housekeeping. Specifically, the training sessions included instructions on food preparation (e.g., food safety, knife skills, cooking methods, kitchen equipment handling and maintenance), beverage production (e.g., beverage equipment handling, inventory and storage principles, cleaning schedules, safety and accident prevention), counter services (e.g., customer interaction, communication, order-taking principles, cash register control, cleanliness and hygiene), casual dining service (e.g., table set-up, communication, billing standards and cash control, handling of complaints, food handling principles), and housekeeping (e.g., making beds, cleaning guest rooms and baths, re-stocking guest amenities, handling special requests, managing household equipment), among others. Students attended class five days a week for six hours a day.

In the second half of the program, participants conducted on-the-job training in hotels, restaurants, and fast food chains in Aizawl. Overall, this part of the intervention was designed to upgrade candidates' skills, equipping them with basic knowledge required to demonstrate eligibility for hospitality-sector job opportunities in international destinations at the interview stage. Concurrently, instructors also helped participants prepare resumes and practice interview skills. Resume formats and interview preparations were designed with the input of our Mumbai-based recruitment firm to ensure that participants' job application materials were consistent with GCC hiring standards. To prepare participants for integration into the GCC countries, instructors also provided them with information on regulations and resources abroad. The focus on preparing trainees for jobs abroad distinguished the training program from other skills-training initiatives that were geared toward domestic employment opportunities. Upon completion of the training session, participants were given a course completion certificate.

In the recruitment stage of the intervention, program participants were invited for interviews with several employers. These interviews were organized by our recruitment partner, Vira International. Every program participant was invited to interview, and most were offered multiple opportunities to do so. The vast majority of those who chose to attend interviews received job offers. Following job offers, Vira and our project manager assisted program participants in obtaining passports and medical certifications. The employers were responsible for providing everything else: work visas, airline tickets, and room and board.

This project represents, to our knowledge, one of the first significant randomized controlled trials that spurred overseas labor migration (Naidu, Nyarko, and Wang 2023). Therefore, comparing our program to prior attempts at spurring migration (Beam, McKenzie, and Yang 2016; McKenzie and Sasin 2007), can shed light on the factors that limit migration more generally. In particular, we highlight two ways that our project departs from prior cross-border migration experiments.

Figure A.2: Photos of Training Program and Participants

First, our program was based in a region, Mizoram, where overseas migration opportunities are scarce. In regions where migration is more common, such as in the Greater Manila region, potential migrants are likely to have more connections and know-how to find jobs overseas. Programs designed to encourage migration with information and logistical support, therefore, may struggle to encourage further migration. In Mizoram, by contrast, there are many individuals interested in migration who have difficulty finding opportunities to do so. Our study's success, therefore, suggests that development programs to encourage migration may be most effective in regions where migration is comparatively low. It also suggests that the political and economic effects of migration are likely to be felt most keenly in newly-opened migration corridors.

Second, our program focused on providing connections for potential migrants to overseas employers. Prior experiments have provided a host of services to potential migrants: job training programs, information about employers, and assistance with application and migration processes. Our program provided these elements, but none of them were unusual in Mizoram or in other migration RCTs. What was unusual was the connections to vetted, reliable overseas employers through a recruitment agency. In contexts with little prior migration, placement agencies serve as critical "migration institutions" (Goss and Lindquist 1995; Sasikumar and Thimothy 2015), closing gaps in knowledge and access and enabling migration. The success of our program suggests that

these connections are essential for encouraging migration.

A.5 Ethical Considerations

Researchers have both moral and professional obligations to minimize harm and maximize potential benefits for research participants. This section details the steps we took to protect research participants from potential harm in this project. We organize our discussion following the "Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research" of the American Political Science Association.

Principle 1: Political science researchers should respect autonomy, consider the wellbeing of participants and other people affected by their research, and be open about the ethical issues they face and the decisions they make when conducting their research. While international employment offers otherwise unattainable economic opportunities for many immigrants, it potentially poses certain costs and risks to their physical or psychological wellbeing. Labor migrants sometimes struggle to integrate into new political and social environments. Relocating for work, especially overseas, requires navigating a complex, often uncertain set of costs and benefits. International employment can be lucrative but it also requires migration-specific knowledge that is difficult to obtain. This explains why individuals who could gain the most from migration often do not migrate (Bryan, Chowdhury, and Mobarak 2014). Specifically, in the context of the GCC, there have been documented instances of migrants facing extortion by recruitment agencies that charge illegal recruitment fees (Sasikumar and Thimothy 2015). Furthermore, Gulf countries have also faced criticism for overlooking employer exploitation, such as the withholding of workers' passports or employers' reneging on promised salaries (Human Rights Watch 2019). Reports of labor code violations have been concentrated in the construction sector; domestic household workers have also experienced exploitation (Human Rights Watch 2019).

This study was conceptualized and embedded within Research & Empirical Analysis of Labor Migration Program (REALM): "REALM aims to shed light on the processes that sustain unfair migrant labor by improving our empirical understanding of the structures and dynamics implicated in recruitment for temporary work in the Gulf region (and, where relevant, elsewhere)." REALM was founded in order to generate scientific knowledge regarding labor migration as a way to remedy labor recruitment practices in the Persian Gulf that are often private, unsupervised, and opaque, and to help develop and promote fairer migrant labor processes that can lead to better outcomes for migrants and their communities.

Within REALM, the goal of our project was to design and evaluate a blueprint for ethical and safe cross-border labor migration, to be used by governments and NGOs in the future. While designing our project, we paid significant consideration to the ethics of the study. We were mindful of the general obligation of researchers "to anticipate and protect participants from trauma stemming from participation in research" (APSA 2020). We worked closely with our partners to minimize the potential risks and costs that participants might face, to ensure that the benefits of this program flow to participants and their communities, and to protect participants' informed consent (Humphreys 2015; Teele 2014).

We situated the study in Mizoram because of the demand for international employment opportunities, both from individuals and from the state government, in this region. The Government of Mizoram's earlier attempts at training and recruitment had drawn large numbers of youth looking for lucrative international work, given the scarcity of employment opportunities

within Mizoram. The Government's Mizoram Youth Commission (MYC), the Chief Minister of Mizoram, and several leading Mizo community organizations sought to create recruitment opportunities for Mizo workers in GCC countries, and called upon researchers to assist in scientifically evaluating processes of skills training and overseas placement that were already underway. By helping connect government and community organizations with reputable partners both inside and outside of India, the program enabled local stakeholders to better screen potential employers, protect citizens during their employment tenures abroad, and facilitate migrant integration. Although we (and the government) could not possibly facilitate supervised employment opportunities for *all* individuals seeking employment abroad, our goal was to help the government and NGOs build an ethical template for future skills development and employment placement programs in the region.

Principle 2: Political science researchers have an individual responsibility to consider the ethics of their research-related activities and cannot outsource ethical reflection to review boards, other institutional bodies, or regulatory agencies. This research project has received IRB approval from Columbia University, Dartmouth College, the US Naval War College, and Stanford University. The project proposal was also reviewed by the grant selection committee of REALM and an advisory committee of five social science faculty unaffiliated with the research team. Apart from the formal IRB reviews, we strove to ensure that our involvement minimized risk to participants and that the benefits of the program flowed directly to participants (Teele 2014; Humphreys 2015). In particular, we worked closely with New York University–Abu Dhabi Office for Compliance & Risk Management to select an employment sector (hospitality) that is relatively reputable compared to sectors where labor violations had previously been reported (e.g. construction), and to choose a recruitment partner with a long and tested history for fair recruitment practices in the hospitality sector in the Persian Gulf. Additionally, we screened specific employers who participated in the job placement component of the study for reputable labor practices.

Principle 3: These principles describe the standards of conduct and reflexive openness that are expected of political science researchers. In some cases, researchers may have good reasons to deviate from these principles (for example, when the principles conflict with each other). In such cases, researchers should acknowledge and justify deviations in scholarly publications and presentations of their work. There were no significant deviations from the principles. Below we discuss the ethical considerations that guided our study.

Principle 4: When designing and conducting research, political scientists should be aware of power differentials between researcher and researched, and the ways in which such power differentials can affect the voluntariness of consent and the evaluation of risk and benefit. Given the economic opportunities presented by our program and the potential power imbalances between the research team and the individuals in our study, we took two major steps to protect the sanctity of the informed consent process. First, we decided that PIs would not interact directly with any of the research subjects. We made this decision so as to not put pressure on potential research participants to take part in the program. The main point of contact for subjects was our project manager in Aizawl. The project manager is Mizo, of a similar age and background as the subjects. Most of these interactions happened in person or by phone/WhatsApp, in the Mizo language. Similarly, all surveys and interviews were also conducted

by Mizos, by either our project manager or local enumerators hired by the survey firm. Subjects were given the option to conduct the surveys and interviews in either Mizo or English.

Second, the recruitment for the program and the three survey waves created distinct decision points for individuals in which they were informed that they could withdraw from the study without any negative impact. In addition, we did not make participation in the training program a condition for attending overseas job interviews. Consequently, many individuals in the treatment group decided against participating in either the training or placement interviews. In addition to the formal consent processes, we specifically trained our project manager to be honest and clear about the potential costs and benefits in any informal interactions with the participants. Our recruitment partner also conducted extensive information sessions with subjects, in which they were provided information about various aspects related to the risks and benefits of working abroad and in the Persian Gulf in particular. Finally, information sessions about the program conducted by the Mizoram Youth Commission and local community organizations were also designed to provide even-handed information about the risks and opportunities associated with pursuing employment abroad.

Principle 5: Political science researchers should generally seek informed consent from individuals who are directly engaged by the research process, especially if research involves more than minimal risk of harm or if it is plausible to expect that engaged individuals would withhold consent if consent were sought. Subjects were required to provide informed consent prior to participating in the study and had the right to withdraw from the project at any point. Additionally, participants had distinct decision points (from participating in surveys and attending the training program, to sitting for placement interviews and deciding to accept employment contracts) where they were able to reaffirm or withdraw consent. For example, participants were asked to provide informed consent at each survey wave: baseline, midline, and endline. The informed consent process is central to the study design (Humphreys 2015; APSA 2020): the participants themselves were the parties most affected by the intervention, and they had clearly marked opportunities throughout the process in which to provide and withdraw consent.

Principle 6: Political science researchers should carefully consider any use of deception and the ways in which deception can conflict with participant autonomy. No deception was used in this study.

Principle 7: Political science researchers should consider the harms associated with their research. One of the major obstacles to fair labor migration is the high costs of migration, often due to illegal recruitment fees (Sasikumar and Thimothy 2015). Prospective migrants may also be subject to the possibility of exploitation overseas. We strived to minimize both of these costs and risks for participants. We designed our skills training and placement program for employment within the hospitality sector, which is relatively reputable, remunerative, and desirable compared to sectors where labor violations had previously been reported (e.g., construction or household work). We worked closely with New York University–Abu Dhabi Office for Compliance & Risk Management to carefully vet project partners and employers. We scrutinized our recruitment partner closely and worked alongside them to screen and assess specific employers that entered the placement program for fair recruitment practices, working conditions, and migrant worker treatment. Employers agreed to charge no recruitment fees, sponsor and guide prospective employees through the work visa authorization process for the receiving country, cover expenses

for round-trip flights, visas, and other immigration costs, help recruited workers relocate and find housing abroad, provide competitive salaries and benefits, and enter into labor contracts that permitted workers to switch employers or leave their jobs at any time. All labor contracts were registered with governmental agencies in both home and host countries. To minimize participants' financial obligations, training (including tuition, course materials, and on-the-job training) was provided free of charge. While not all participants may eventually obtain employment in the GCC, their training was deemed broadly useful for jobs in the hospitality sector.

Cognizant of potential power differentials between employees and employers, we strove to empower participants by informing them of their rights and resources in destination countries. The GCC states have passed several decrees in recent years that require employers to cover recruitment expenses (including visas and costs of travel), provide competitive salaries and benefits, and furnish housing and health fees for foreign workers. New reforms allow workers to leave their jobs at any time (subject to contractual obligations) and make it easier for workers to switch employers. Under the new policies in the U.A.E., for instance, prospective migrants sign a standard employment offer in their home country that is registered at the Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratisation (MoHRE) before a work permit is issued. Once the worker arrives in the country, the agreement becomes registered as the contract and no changes are allowed unless the employer extends further benefits to the worker. Our project provided subjects with detailed information regarding the locations and helpline numbers of MoHRE offices. Additionally, the Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India has established Indian Workers Resource Centres in GCC countries that provide helplines and conduct awareness classes and counseling programs on legal, financial, and social issues. Our project ensured that subjects were aware of these resources and had access to them. In addition, in order to assist with integration and reintegration, our project provided participants with access to comprehensive information regarding legal and counseling services both in the GCC states and in Mizoram. They were made aware of the option of availing counseling services free of cost (with the cost of these services covered by the project).

We took a number of steps to guarantee that participants were provided extensive information regarding the potential risks associated with international employment before agreeing to participate in the training and recruitment program. Individuals attended information sessions detailing opportunities and challenges associated with overseas employment. During these presentations, subjects were informed about the potential risks associated with the process of international employment, including the risk of labor law violations by employers. Additionally, we designed the project such that our field research team would follow up regularly with all participants who undertook employment abroad to check on their wellbeing and safety.

Principle 8: Political science researchers should anticipate and protect individual participants from trauma stemming from participation in research. Under Principles 1 and 7, we discussed the steps taken to protect participants from harms stemming from this research project. In addition to providing migrants with information on risks, rights, and resources for working in the GCC, we have followed up with subjects regularly outside of the three survey waves.

We wished to ensure that those who have received job offers abroad, in particular, did not face harm from employment practices in the GCC. To address this possibility, our local research manager contacted research subjects regularly to make sure that they received help from our recruitment partner in obtaining necessary documents and information prior to migration, that after arrival to the host country employers did not violate their rights, and that during the Covid-19 pandemic they had the resources to return home or to stay in the GCC, according to their wishes. After the

endline survey, we also conducted long-form, semi-structured interviews with individual subjects who had migrated abroad in order to better understand the migration experience and to provide access to counselling, if needed. Within these interviews, we specifically asked respondents if they had experienced any discrimination in the workplace and none of the respondents indicated any such experience.

Principle 9: Political science researchers should generally keep the identities of research participants confidential; when circumstances require, researchers should adopt the higher standard of ensuring anonymity. We took steps to keep our participants' identities confidential in this project. Enumerators collected the names and contact information of respondents, but that information was immediately encrypted and uploaded to a secure central server. Only the project investigators and the survey team' project manager were able to access the file linking the encrypted identifying information to the anonymous numerical ID associated with each respondent. In other words, anyone else working on the survey (e.g., enumerators, other employees of the survey firm, etc.), was only able to see a number ID associated with the survey responses. In any reproduction material, we will only make the numerical IDs of respondents available, stripped of any identifying information.

Principle 10: Political science researchers conducting studies on political processes should consider the broader social impacts of the research process as well as the impact on the experience of individuals directly engaged by the research. In general, political science researchers should not compromise the integrity of political processes for research purposes without the consent of individuals that are directly engaged by the research process. Besides the research subjects, one other group of individuals directly impacted by our study was the subjects' family members. Therefore, it was important that families were aware of the process, costs, and benefits of the program. During the registration process, the project manager encouraged subjects to take information home to their families and discuss the opportunity before signing up. We also held public information sessions open to the community, particularly to interested individuals and their families. At these sessions, the project manager, the head of our local NGO training partner, and one of our co-PIs answered any questions, attempting to be as honest as possible about the purpose, costs, and benefits of the program. Additionally, our study was conducted in conjunction with the Government of Mizoram's Mizoram Youth Commission, with the permission of the Chief Minister of Mizoram, and prominent local community organizations such as the MZP. Receiving government and community buy-in for the study helped ensure that the broader social impacts of the research were understood by relevant stakeholders apart from the research subjects themselves. Note that our study was designed to not interfere with nor compromise the integrity of political processes either in the home country or in any of the host countries.

Principle 11: Political science researchers should be aware of relevant laws and regulations governing their research related activities. Given that India does not have laws about non-clinical human subjects research, the guidelines of the Indian Council of Medical Research to have ethical review boards examine research design were followed by obtaining IRB approval from the home institutions of all members of the research team. In addition, this research project has also complied with all applicable Indian and GCC laws about labor migration by making sure with our recruitment partner that all labor contracts were registered at the appropriate agencies prior to migration. Overall, the program was designed to significantly improve and safeguard

recruitment and employment processes for prospective migrants as compared to individuals who decided to migrate on their own accord or through unsupervised private channels. It was anticipated that future government initiatives in the region would be able to benefit from the knowledge generated and the connections created by the program.

A principal reason for working with partners was to ensure that our project followed relevant laws and regulations, both in Mizoram and in the Gulf Region. In Mizoram, we partnered with a state government office (Mizoram Youth Commission) and a local non-governmental organization (SJnDI), who helped us navigate local laws and regulations. In the Gulf Region, our recruitment partner assisted our research subjects in navigating immigration laws and provided legal recourse for any workplace issues. Subjects were also provided a list of counseling services in both Mizoram and the GCC, and were given the option of availing these services with the cost covered by the program budget.

Principle 12: The responsibility to promote ethical research goes beyond the individual researcher or research team. Throughout the research design and implementation phase, we workshopped the research design and solicited feedback on research ethics with scholars in several social scientific scholarly venues, including conferences on migration, gender, and experimental research (notably Evidence in Governance and Politics).

A.6 Cost-Benefit Comparison for Intervention

We conducted a rough estimate of the costs and benefits of our training and recruitment program. This is valuable for two reasons. First, it acts as an impact evaluation for the program as an economic development intervention. Second, it helps inform the discussion of ethical considerations to weigh the benefits for candidates against the costs for researchers. Many observational studies argue that migration has significant economic benefits (Yang and Choi 2007; Abramitzky and Braggion 2006; Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson 2012; Doyle 2015; Ahmed 2012), yet ascertaining these effects is difficult because migrants differ systematically from non-migrants. In the absence of strong affirmative evidence that migration can be economically beneficial, changes in migration policy is often politically fraught. Therefore, our project can complement evidence from these observational studies—as well as from oversubscribed government lotteries (Gibson and McKenzie 2014; Mobarak, Sharif, and Shreshta 2021)— in estimating the economic costs and benefits of encouraging migration.

For costs, we estimated all major costs of conducting the training and recruitment program in 2018 and 2019. This did not include, for example, the costs of the surveys and the time of the research team. It did, however, include travel costs for researchers and for the training program team, as well as all costs for training and placement.

For benefits, we used the endline survey's estimates of individuals' monthly wages at endline. On average, individuals in the treatment group had monthly wages approximately 5,650 INR higher than those in the control group, or 5,530 INR when controlling for pre-treatment covariates. Using the more conservative estimate, we estimated the annual increase in candidates' wages.

Overall, we estimate that the program generated nearly 900 USD per person per year in benefits (despite just 23% of the treatment group migrating) against just over 200 USD per person in costs. Though much of this financial benefit accrued to the migrants themselves, beneficiaries of the program sent significant remittances home to family. We estimate that treatment individuals sent home between 200 and 500 USD more per year than their counterparts in the control group, depending on which measures are used. Even using the more conservative estimates, this suggests

that the program paid yearly dividends to the families of treatment individuals that approximately matched the total cost of the program. As an economic development program, the intervention was extremely cost-effective.

Table A.1: Costs and Benefits of the Program

Costs of Intervention	
Training Program (USD)	22,200
Location Rental for Training (USD)	4,000
Advertising & Registration Costs (USD)	1,000
Visa & Certification Assistance for Candidates (USD)	1,700
One Year of Salary for Program Manager (USD)	8,000
Travel Costs for Research Team (USD)	6,000
Total Cost (USD)	**42,900**
Cost Per Person (USD)	**220**
Benefits to Candidates (Per Year)	
Monthly Wages Increase Per Person (INR)	5,530
Yearly Wages Increase Per Person (USD)	**885**
Benefits to Families (Per Year)	
Monthly Remittances Per Person, Self-Reported (INR)	3,150
Monthly Remittances Per Household, Family-Reported (INR)	1,340
Yearly Remittances Per Person (USD)	**200-475**

B Balance and Attrition

B.1 Balance Table

The following regressions attempt to predict treatment status by pre-treatment covariates, among each of the four survey stages: baseline (pre-treatment), midline (post-treatment but pre-migration), endline (two years post-migration), and the household survey. The covariates include both demographic characteristics and pre-treatment measures of key outcome variables. We find little evidence of significant differences between treatment and control group in any of the three survey stages, even after attrition. In fact, the treatment groups were remarkably balanced. Not one of the ten pre-treatment covariates predicted treatment status at any stage, and the omnibus F-test (p-values at the bottom) shows that even the combination of all ten variables provides no predictive value on treatment group at any stage. This balance is partly because the subjects were grouped into demographically similar pairs for treatment assignment.

B.2 Tests for Attrition Bias

In addition to the balance tests before and after treatment (and attrition), we also conducted two tests for attrition bias in the midline, endline, and household surveys.

First, we tested whether attrition was greatly affected by treatment assignment itself – i.e. whether the differences in response rates between the treatment and control groups are larger than what might be expected based purely on chance. For the midline and endline surveys, there is no

Table B.2: Balance Test on Four Surveys

	Dependent variable: Treatment			
	Baseline	Midline	Endline	Household
Age	−0.008	−0.005	−0.006	−0.010
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Male	0.004	0.016	−0.041	−0.043
	(0.053)	(0.062)	(0.067)	(0.060)
Education	0.028	0.008	0.060	0.014
	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.036)
Employed	0.016	−0.125	−0.130	−0.134
	(0.111)	(0.130)	(0.145)	(0.134)
Scheduled Tribe	−0.045	−0.057	−0.087	−0.063
	(0.123)	(0.162)	(0.166)	(0.134)
Married	0.125	0.142	0.254	0.108
	(0.203)	(0.310)	(0.315)	(0.263)
English Ability	0.001	−0.015	−0.005	−0.006
	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.029)
Economic Status	−0.015	0.036	0.060	0.049
	(0.042)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.049)
Economic Confidence	−0.014	0.023	0.011	−0.028
	(0.039)	(0.045)	(0.052)	(0.047)
Redistribution Attitudes	−0.015	−0.017	0.018	0.002
	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Observations	384	286	244	300
F-Stat P-Value	.994	.992	.893	.970
F-Stat P-Value (RI)	.959	.978	.823	.922
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

significant evidence that the treatment affected response rates. The RI-based test shows that even if the treatment had no effect on attrition in any individual case, the randomization procedure would have resulted in larger differences between the two groups in almost 30% of cases for the endline and 40% of cases for the midline. For the household survey, there is a clear difference in response rates between the treatment and control groups: the control group responded at a much higher rate (84%) than the control group (70%).

Second, we tested whether attrition rates for the midline or endline surveys were affected by any pre-treatment covariates. For each survey, we ran three regressions predicting survey response based on pre-treatment covariates. The first column predicts response rates based on the seven key demographic covariates. The second column adds in the pre-treatment measures of the key outcome variables: economic status, economic confidence, and economic policy attitudes. For the midline and endline surveys, these variables provide no additional predictive value, as shown by the F-tests at the bottom of the tables, whose p-values range roughly from .2 to .5. The household surveys

Table B.3: Response Rates: Treatment vs. Control Group

	Midline	***Endline***	***Household***
Response Rate: Treatment Group	76.0 %	65.8%	70.4%
Response Rate: Control Group	71.9 %	60.7%	84.2%
Difference in Response Rate	4.1 %	5.1%	13.8%
P-Value: Two-Sample T-Test	.358	.296	.001
P-Value: RI-based Test	.392	.268	.002

do suggest some shift in respondents, with family members of those employed and economically confident at the baseline less likely to respond to the household survey.

The third column of each table adds in interaction terms to test whether each of these covariates differentially affected attrition in treatment and control groups. For the midline and endline surveys, there was no evidence overall that pre-treatment characteristics systematically predicted attrition in the treatment or control group. While there are a few significant effects on response rate, these are to be expected because so many explanatory variables are being tested. Omnibus F-tests show that these models also do not provide any predictive value beyond what would be expected from randomly-generated covariates. For the household survey, these models suggest that the bias in response toward the families of lower-income and unemployed individuals happens primarily in the treatment group. Given that higher-income individuals are generally less supportive of redistribution, this should bias against our results.

Table B.4: Predictors of Response Rate:Midline

	Dependent variable: Response		
Age	−0.010	−0.010	−0.014
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Education	0.0001	0.003	0.030
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.038)
Scheduled Tribe	0.128	0.128	0.093
	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.164)
Employed	−0.024	0.030	0.244*
	(0.065)	(0.096)	(0.140)
Married	−0.236	−0.207	−0.169
	(0.172)	(0.175)	(0.296)
Male	−0.046	−0.039	−0.073
	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.066)
English Ability	0.006	0.011	0.033
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.031)
Economic Status		−0.034	−0.099**
		(0.036)	(0.049)
Economic Confidence		−0.022	−0.071
		(0.034)	(0.047)
Redistribution Attitudes		−0.004	−0.003
		(0.022)	(0.030)
Treatment			−0.441
			(0.549)
Treat x Age			0.010
			(0.016)
Treat x Education			−0.061
			(0.057)
Treat x ST			0.065
			(0.221)
Treat x Employed			−0.407**
			(0.194)
Treat x Married			−0.130
			(0.374)
Treat x Male			0.050
			(0.093)
Treat x English			−0.041
			(0.044)
Treat x Econ. Status			0.130*
			(0.074)
Treat x Econ. Confidence			0.100
			(0.069)
Treat x Redist. Attitudes			0.0002
			(0.043)
Observations	389	384	384
F-Stat P-Value	.252	.399	.417
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.5: Predictors of Response Rate: Endline

	Dependent variable: Response		
Age	0.001	−0.001	−0.006
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Education	0.018	0.013	−0.020
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.042)
Scheduled Tribe	0.123	0.110	0.152
	(0.116)	(0.117)	(0.180)
Employed	−0.098	−0.154	−0.004
	(0.072)	(0.106)	(0.154)
Married	−0.137	−0.157	−0.080
	(0.190)	(0.193)	(0.324)
Male	−0.031	−0.043	0.012
	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.072)
English Ability	0.043*	0.035	0.039
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.034)
Economic Status		0.031	−0.046
		(0.040)	(0.054)
Economic Confidence		0.047	0.021
		(0.037)	(0.051)
Redistribution Attitudes		−0.003	−0.047
		(0.024)	(0.032)
Treatment			−0.733
			(0.602)
Treat x Aage			0.011
			(0.017)
Treat x Education			0.070
			(0.062)
Treat x ST			−0.051
			(0.242)
Treat x Employed			−0.315
			(0.212)
Treat x Married			−0.108
			(0.410)
Treat x Male			−0.136
			(0.102)
Treat x English			−0.012
			(0.049)
Treat x Econ. Status			0.180**
			(0.081)
Treat x Econ. Confidence			0.063
			(0.075)
Treat x Redist. Attitudes			0.088*
			(0.047)
Observations	389	384	384
F-Stat P-Value	.314	.461	.220
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.6: Predictors of Response Rate: Household

	Dependent variable: Response		
Age	0.010	0.009	0.011
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)
Education	0.023	0.016	0.044
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.035)
Scheduled Tribe	−0.057	−0.058	−0.058
	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.153)
Employed	−0.128**	−0.191**	−0.002
	(0.062)	(0.090)	(0.130)
Married	−0.191	−0.212	−0.225
	(0.163)	(0.164)	(0.274)
Male	−0.019	−0.036	0.042
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.061)
English Ability	0.031	0.021	0.024
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.029)
Economic Status		0.034	−0.041
		(0.034)	(0.045)
Economic Confidence		0.058*	0.085*
		(0.032)	(0.043)
Redistribution Attitudes		0.020	−0.004
		(0.020)	(0.027)
Treatment			0.379
			(0.509)
Treat x Age			−0.008
			(0.015)
Treat x Education			−0.045
			(0.053)
Treat x ST			0.006
			(0.205)
Treat x Employed			−0.372**
			(0.180)
Treat x Married			−0.041
			(0.347)
Treat x Male			−0.152*
			(0.086)
Treat x English			−0.012
			(0.041)
Treat x Econ. Status			0.165**
			(0.068)
Treat x Econ. Status			−0.056
			(0.064)
Treat x Redist. Attitudes			0.048
			(0.040)
Observations	389	384	384
F-Stat P-Value	.080	.022	.015

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.3 Controlling for Demographic Imbalances

Given the attrition in our surveys – and especially the slight imbalances in attrition in the household survey – it is worth asking whether our main findings on redistribution attitudes would be robust to including pre-treatment demographic controls. Therefore, we expand on the results in Table D.15 by controlling for all pre-treatment demographic characteristics.

Main Endline Results

For the main individual-level survey, we find nearly identical results when including baseline demographic controls. Individuals in the treatment group were approximately one third of a standard deviation more fiscally conservative than those in the treatment group. The findings are slightly less precise because of the inclusion of more unpredictive pre-treatment covariates, but otherwise are extremely similar.

Table B.7: Redistribution Attitudes Results with Controls (Endline)

	Index	*Components*		
		Taxes	Mobility	Inequality
Treatment	0.330**	0.115	0.094	0.232
	(0.145)	(0.140)	(0.077)	(0.149)
Age	−0.005	0.030	−0.005	−0.026
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.013)	(0.026)
Male	−0.105	−0.014	−0.067	−0.025
	(0.148)	(0.143)	(0.079)	(0.152)
Education	0.049	−0.033	0.010	0.089
	(0.091)	(0.087)	(0.048)	(0.093)
Employed	−0.597*	−0.111	−0.041	−0.750**
	(0.321)	(0.310)	(0.172)	(0.331)
Scheduled Tribe	−0.097	0.046	0.028	−0.245
	(0.367)	(0.354)	(0.195)	(0.377)
Married	−0.849	−0.420	−0.257	−0.448
	(0.696)	(0.672)	(0.371)	(0.717)
English	−0.070	0.008	−0.017	−0.084
	(0.071)	(0.069)	(0.038)	(0.073)
Econ. Status	0.224*	0.050	0.080	0.155
	(0.117)	(0.113)	(0.063)	(0.121)
Econ. Confidence	0.030	−0.021	0.065	−0.054
	(0.115)	(0.111)	(0.061)	(0.118)
Redist. Attitudes	0.022	0.097	−0.041	0.018
	(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.036)	(0.069)
Observations	244	242	243	244
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Household Results

For the household survey, the results in B.8 suggest that our results for the household may actually be stronger and more surprising when adjusting for these biases. When controlling for pre-treatment demographics, the parents and siblings of treatment individuals are even more supportive of redistribution relative to those of control individuals. This, notably, is the opposite effect as the effect on the attitudes of treatment individuals themselves: while migrants become less supportive of redistribution, their parents and siblings become more supportive.

Table B.8: Redistribution Attitudes Results with Controls (Household)

	Index	Components		
		Taxes	Inequality	Mobility
Treatment	-0.271^{**}	-0.100	-0.212^{**}	-0.119
	(0.114)	(0.138)	(0.106)	(0.075)
Age	0.006	-0.015	0.011	0.009
	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.013)
Male	-0.049	-0.147	0.135	-0.071
	(0.117)	(0.141)	(0.109)	(0.076)
Education	0.021	-0.136	0.085	0.046
	(0.069)	(0.084)	(0.064)	(0.046)
Employed	-0.334	-0.163	-0.008	-0.295^{*}
	(0.260)	(0.313)	(0.241)	(0.170)
Scheduled Tribe	0.743^{***}	0.531^{*}	0.537^{**}	0.187
	(0.260)	(0.314)	(0.240)	(0.168)
Married	1.261^{**}	0.774	0.414	0.718^{**}
	(0.511)	(0.616)	(0.470)	(0.330)
English Ability	0.061	0.119^{*}	-0.013	0.016
	(0.057)	(0.068)	(0.053)	(0.037)
Econ. Status	0.056	0.079	-0.051	0.056
	(0.096)	(0.115)	(0.089)	(0.063)
Econ. Confidence	-0.290^{***}	-0.245^{**}	-0.096	-0.144^{**}
	(0.092)	(0.112)	(0.086)	(0.061)
Redist. Attitudes	0.037	0.090	0.008	-0.012
	(0.056)	(0.067)	(0.051)	(0.037)
Observations	300	299	294	291

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.4 Sensitivity Analysis

Sensitivity Analysis for Endline Attrition

Given the relatively low response rate (64%) in the main survey, we investigate how robust our results would be to various scenarios of "missing" redistribution views. To do so, we generated hypothetical outcomes on the redistribution index for those who attrited from our sample and calculated the same ATE estimates as our main results. Each of the seven scenarios projects a different treatment effect among attriters. The most important of these are estimates of the highest and lowest individual-level treatment effects estimated in our subsequent hetereogeneity analysis (Appendix G) and likely migrants / likely non-migrants analysis (Appendix E.3). These both use demographic subgroups to estimate the range of possible individual treatment effects. We also added three other hypothetical ATEs: the ATE estimated among the full sample ($ATE = +.35$), no effect ($ATE = 0$), and an equally strong effect in the opposite direction ($ATE = -.35$). The results are displayed below in Figure B.3.

Of all of these, the only scenario that reduces the effect size even close to statistical insignificance is the final one, which poses a strong treatment effect among attriters in the opposite direction. The only scenario in which this could be true is if attrition were highly positively correlated to redistribution views in the control group or highly negatively correlated with redistribution views in the treatment group. For example, if it were coming from the treatment group, the individuals in the treatment group would have to have a higher correlation between redistribution views and attrition ($r = .23$) than between baseline and endline measures of economic standing ($r = .21$). Even in this extreme case, the ATE estimate would still be relatively large ($ATE = .19$) and statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level.

Figure B.3: Sensitivity Analysis: Main Redistribution Results



Estimated ATE with seven sets of hypothetical outcomes for attriters. ATE estimates, from left to right: highest estimated effects in heterogeneity analysis, estimated effect among likely migrants, estimated effect among full sample, estimated effect among likely non-migrants, lowest estimated effect in heterogeneity analysis, effect = 0, and effect equally strong as full sample but in the opposite direction (ATE= -.35). 90% confidence intervals shown.

Sensitivity Analysis for Differential Attrition (Household)

Given that response rates differ by treatment condition in the household survey (84% in control, 70% in treatment), it is worth investigating the range of biases that this might introduce to the household results. To do so, we adopted the Gerber and Green (2012) and Lee (2009) "trimming bounds" approach. If there is more attrition in the treatment group, we can drop different groups of 26 control units (to equalize the response rates) and estimate the treatment effect among the remaining observations. This yields a range of different hypothetical treatment effects we might expect to observe among the subset of the population who would have responded regardless of their treatment group ("always-responders").

Figure B.4 shows the range of potential treatment effect estimates. The leftmost and rightmost estimates drop the 26 most pro-redistribution and 26 most anti-redistribution control respondents, respectively, in order to hypothetically correct for the most extreme possible bias from differential attrition. The intermediate scenarios drop random selections of different units (drawing from the top half, the top three quarters, the bottom three quarters, and the bottom half, respectively.

The results suggest that the treatment had somewhere between no effect and a large pro-redistribution effect on the attitudes of family members. Even making the most extreme possible assumption, that differential attrition erased only the most anti-redistribution family members in the treatment group, the estimated treatment effect is estimated to be almost exactly zero – and not, notably, a anti-redistribution effect as observed among migrants themselves. In the other scenarios, the ATE was estimated to be negative, albeit only statistically significant if the bias was neutral or against the pro-redistribution finding (as the prior analysis with demographic controls suggests).

Figure B.4: Sensitivity Analysis: Household Redistribution Results



Estimated ATE with current household sample (center) and six hypothetical samples removing a subset of control respondents. Respondents removed, from left to right: 26 most pro-redistribution control respondents, random selection from 50th percentile and below, random selection from 75th percentile and below, (none), random selection from 25th percentile and above, random selection from 50th percentile and above, and 26 most anti-redistribution respondents. 90% confidence intervals shown.

B.5 Attrition Rates on Similar RCTs

For comparison, we also looked at response rates on a set of comparable studies. In particular, we were interested in RCTs and observational studies that met three conditions that define our attrition scenario. First, they had to attempt to recontact specific individuals (or at least individual households) in order to study individual-level effects. Recontact is much harder if it requires reaching specific individuals rather than any individual in a community. Second, the studies had to be development or migration-oriented studies working with relatively low-income populations in low- or middle-income countries. These populations tend to be mobile and have tenuous contact information. Third, the studies had to attempt recontact with these individuals multiple years after the initial contact. In our study, participants had more than two and a half years to move, change contact information, and change priorities. This was not intended to be an exhaustive search, but a brief examination of promisingly similar papers – including all of the papers cited elsewhere in the paper.

On 2-5 year follow-up surveys of specific individuals, the response rates in these surveys ranged from 61% to 91%. They are described below in descending order of response rate.

- Jensen (2012) reports a 91% response rate on a two-year follow-up survey on a job program for women in rural India. They also report that the survey took a team six months to administer, and that the population was more geographically stable than ours.
- Gibson and McKenzie (2014) report a 78% response rate on a two-year follow-up on a migration lottery in Tonga. Importantly, the unit of interest is the household, so any family

member of the individual could fill out the survey, as in our family member survey, which had a higher response rate.

- Beam, McKenzie, and Yang (2016) report a 73% response rate on a two-year follow-up on a migration encouragement RCT in the Philippines. As with our study, they had a higher response rate in an additional household survey.
- Beegle, De Weerdt, and Dercon (2011) report a 70% response rate in a ten-year follow-up survey on a migration study in Tanzania. They spent significant resources to track all baseline survey participants throughout the duration of the study.
- Mobarak, Sharif, and Shreshta (2021) report 69% and 68% response rates among the main treatment and control group in a five-year follow-up on a visa lottery for Bangladeshi workers to move to Malaysia.
- Naidu, Nyarko, and Wang (2023) report a 65% response rate on an initial follow-up survey approximately one-and-a-half years after a migration RCT in India. Additional tracking surveys, family surveys, and administrative data provide data on an aditional 16% of their sample.
- Blattman, Fiala, and Martinez (2020) report 63% and 61% response rates on two- and four-year follow-ups, respectively, examining a youth jobs program in Uganda.

Given the response rates on these comparable surveys, and given the challenge of reaching our highly mobile, young population, one should probably expect a response rate between 60% and 75% on a two-and-a-half-year follow-up survey like ours.

C Key Outcome Questions

Table C.9: Questions: Economic Position

Question	**Options**
Are you currently employed?	Yes No
[If employed] What are your currently monthly wages?	Amount (in INR)
What category best describes your total monthly household income?	Less than Rs. 5,000 Rs. 5,001 - Rs. 10,000 Rs. 10,001 - Rs. 20,000 Rs. 20,001 - Rs. 30,000 Rs. 30,001 - Rs. 40,000 Rs. 40,001 - Rs. 50,000 Rs. 50,001 - Rs. 100,000 Rs. 100,001 and above
Please indicate the number of the following items in your home: Car Motorbike Refrigerator Mobile phone with internet connection Computer Washing Machine	[Number for each] [For analysis, we reduced this to a standardized index of material possessions.]

Table C.10: Questions: Family Planning

Question	**Options**
[If not married] At what age do you plan to marry?	[Number]
[If no children] At what age do you plan to have children?	[Number]

Table C.11: Questions: Confidence in Economic Prospects

Question	**Options**
Do you think your next job will pay better or worse than the average salary in Mizoram?	Much better Somewhat better About the same Somewhat worse Much worse
In the next year, do you think your own and your family's economic situation will be better or worse?	Much better Somewhat better About the same Somewhat worse Much worse
When you are the age your parents are now, do you think you will be better off or worse off financially than them?	Much better off Somewhat better off About the same Somewhat worse off Much worse off
Do you agree or disagree that in the future you will be able to advance professionally, get promoted, and earn higher incomes?	Strongly agree Somewhat agree Neither agree nor disagree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree

Table C.12: Questions: Economy Policy Preferences

Question	**Options**
In general, do you think that it is possible for someone who is born poor to become rich by working hard?	It is almost impossible It is somewhat possible It is very possible
Do you agree or disagree: Should the government reduce income differences between the rich and the poor?	Strongly agree Somewhat agree Neither agree nor disagree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree
Do you agree or disagree: The government should lower taxes for ordinary people, even if it means that it will have less funding for public services to help the poor in Mizoram.	Strongly agree Somewhat agree Neither agree nor disagree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree

D Main Results

All of our major hypotheses posit an effect of treatment assignment (τ) on some attitude or behavior (y). For each outcome, we also have a measure of the same outcome (or a similar outcome) from the baseline survey (X). The results, then are estimated using OLS with the following model:

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \tau_i + \alpha X_i + \epsilon_i \tag{1}$$

Due to the limited number of observations, small size of blocks, and the possibility of attrition, we do not use block (pair) fixed effects. The main p-values given in the paper are calculated using randomization inference with this model, but here we also include the p-values derived from OLS standard errors. We also include the RI-based p-values for the difference-in-means between the treatment and control group.

D.1 Migration and Political Attitudes

Table D.13: Full Results: Migration

	Diff-in-Means			OLS				
	C	***T***	***P(RI)***	***ATE***	***SE***	***P(RI)***	***P(OLS)***	***N***
Moved Overseas	.03	.23	.000	+.20	.04	.000	.000	248
Training Program	.43	.58	.011	+.14	.06	.009	.012	245
Job Offer	.08	.34	.000	+.25	.05	.000	.000	231
Moved in India	.32	.13	.000	-.19	.05	.000	.000	247

Table D.14: Barriers in the Migration Process for Treatment and Control Subjects

	Treatment	***Control***
Did not apply for a job abroad	59	69
Applied, but did not receive an offer	23	29
Received an offer, but did not accept	9	4
Accepted a job, but did not receive a visa	3	3
Received a visa, but did not move	1	0
Moved abroad	29	2

Percentage of each group that stopped at a certain step of moving abroad.

Table D.15: Full Results: Redistribution Attitudes

	Diff-in-Means			OLS				2SLS		
	C	***T***	***P(RI)***	***ATE***	***SE***	***P(RI)***	***P***	***CACE***	***P***	***N***
Endline										
Redistribution Index	—	.34	.006	+.35	.14	.005	.007	+1.74	.013	248
Taxes	3.78	3.91	.168	+.13	.14	.163	.174	+.63	.176	246
Mobility	2.46	2.56	.090	+.10	.08	.079	.085	+.51	.087	247
Inequality	1.81	2.04	.061	+.23	.15	.062	.059	+1.16	.073	248
Midline										
Redistribution Index	—	.21	.028	+.21	.12	.029	.036	+1.23	.024	288
Taxes	3.89	4.00	.145	+.12	.11	.139	.141	+.54	.178	288
Mobility	2.62	2.70	.080	+.08	.06	.086	.086	+.56	.041	288
Inequality	2.06	2.15	.267	+.09	0.14	.266	.270	+.51	.237	288
Household										
Redistribution Index	—	-.22	.972	-.23	.12	.974	.974	-1.60	.959	304
Taxes	2.81	2.75	.673	-.06	.14	.675	.668	-.43	.661	303
Mobility	2.49	2.40	.880	-.10	.08	.901	.899	-.47	.783	295
Inequality	1.63	1.43	.964	-.20	.11	.963	.967	-1.69	.976	298

Note: Preregistered hypothesis was that redistribution attitudes would move toward more fiscally conservative views for all surveys. High P-values on household survey, therefore, correspond to large effects in the opposite direction.

Figure D.5: Location of Subjects over Time



Table D.16: Results: Efforts to Migrate

	Diff-in-Means			OLS			
	Treat	***Ctrl***	***P(RI)***	***ATE***	***P(RI)***	***P(OLS)***	***N***
Index	**.742**	—	**.000**	**+ .746**	**.000**	**.000**	**290**
Obtained Passport	.80	.40	.000	+ .40	.000	.000	289
Researched Labor Laws (1-3)	1.91	1.70	.004	+ .21	.004	.004	288
Researched Employers (1-3)	1.70	1.54	.002	+ .17	.002	.002	287

Passport fees in India range between Rs.1,500 and Rs.4,000, half of the average month's wage for employed individuals at baseline.

D.2 Economic Standing and Confidence

Table D.17: Full Results: Economic Standing

	Diff-in-Means			OLS				2SLS	
	C	***T***	***P(RI)***	***ATE***	***SE***	***P(RI)***	***P(OLS)***	***CACE***	***P(2SI***
Economic Index	—	.58	.000	+.56	.15	.000	.000	+2.82	.000
Employed	.39	.43	.233	+.05	.06	.217	.222	+.25	.217
Wages (INR)	4,800	10,400	.001	+5,500	1800	.001	.001	+27,900	.000
Family Income (1-8)	4.45	5.10	.003	+.61	.22	.004	.003	+3.22	.006
Material Goods Index	—	.39	.002	+.35	.12	.001	.001	+1.75	.005

Table D.18: Full Results: Economic Confidence

	Diff-in-Means			OLS				2SLS	
	C	***T***	***P(RI)***	***ATE***	***SE***	***P(RI)***	***P(OLS)***	***CACE***	***P(2SI***
Confidence Index	—	.20	.090	+.20	.14	.090	.078	+.95	.077
Will Advance Professionally	4.20	4.33	.121	+.12	.11	.118	.128	+.60	.125
Next Job Salary	3.46	3.74	.002	+.28	.09	.002	.001	+1.34	.002
Family Situation	3.79	3.88	.151	+.10	.08	.128	.110	+.48	.113
Better off than parents	4.03	3.94	.844	-.09	.08	.859	.871	-0.44	.862

Table D.19: Full Results: Family Planning

	Diff-in-Means			OLS				2SLS		
	C	***T***	***P(RI)***	***ATE***	***SE***	***P(RI)***	***P(OLS)***	***CACE***	***P(2SLS)***	***N***
Endline										
Life Plans Index	—	.64	.000	+.65	.16	.000	.000	+3.30	.001	23
Marriage Age	29.65	31.28	.000	+1.82	.45	.000	.000	+8.87	.001	22
Childbearing Age	30.66	32.37	.000	+1.69	.42	.000	.000	+8.53	.001	23
Midline										
Life Plans Index	—	.12	.19	+.12	.13	.169	.171	+.31	.317	26
Marriage Age	30.26	30.47	.283	+.31	.36	.192	.191	+.52	.384	25
Childbearing Age	31.07	31.50	.131	+.40	.36	.142	.139	+1.24	.256	25

D.3 Benchmarking Effect Size

How large is our main effect (+.35 Standard Deviations on a standardized index) relative to other predictors of redistribution attitudes? Here, we benchmark this finding using additional covariates from our own data as well as data from the World Values Survey. To make these effects

comparable, we reduced all predictors to binary dummies. From the World Values Survey (Wave 7), we examined the three most comparable questions to our three measures of redistribution attitudes (Questions 106,108, and 110, respectively), and, because these questions were on a different scale (1-9 vs. 1-5), created a standardized index for each country comparable to our main findings. Benchmarking in terms of variance provides the most parallel possible comparison between items with different scale. The most recent round of WVS data was not yet available from India itself, but we examined data from the three most comparable close countries available – Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Indonesia – as well as from the United States. We tested the bivariate treatment effect of three commonly-discussed predictors of redistribution attitudes: union membership, gender, and education.

The results (Table D.20) show that our main treatment effect is larger than all 14 of these comparisons. Our main treatment effect is larger than the comparable effect of income, union membership, gender, education, and even pre-existing redistribution attitudes.

Table D.20: Comparing Main Treatment Effect to Other Comparable Effects

Data Source	**Independent Variable**	**ATE**
Experiment Data	*Treatment Assignment*	*+ .35*
Experiment Data	Baseline Economic Standing (Above Mean)	+ .16
Experiment Data	Baseline Redistribution Attitudes (Above Mean)	+ .01
WVS (Pakistan)	Union Member	- .13
WVS (Pakistan)	Male	+ .04
WVS (Pakistan)	Completed Secondary Education	+.20
WVS (Bangladesh)	Union Member	+.06
WVS (Bangladesh)	Male	+ .09
WVS (Bangladesh)	Completed Secondary Education	+.13
WVS (Indonesia)	Union Member	- .08
WVS (Indonesia)	Male	+ .09
WVS (Indonesia)	Completed Secondary Education	+ .23
WVS (USA)	Union Member	- .13
WVS (USA)	Male	+ .19
WVS (USA)	Completed Secondary Education	- .10

E Exploratory Tests for Mechanisms

E.1 Institutional Trust

Table E.21: Trust In Institutions

	Index	*Components*					
		Trust?			Capable?		
		Natl	State	Local	Natl	State	Local
Treatment Effect	+.248	+.05	+.22	+.29	+.12	+.33	+.07
(SE)	(.13)	(.10)	(.11)	(.15)	(.11)	(.12)	(.16)
RI P-value	.056	.605	.053	.054	.282	.006	.627
Control Mean	—	2.93	2.70	3.03	2.97	2.70	3.10
N	248	248	248	248	248	248	248

Note: *Trust:* On a scale of 1 to 4, where 1 is "not at all," and 4 is "completely," could you please tell me how much you TRUST each government? *Capable:* On a scale of 1 to 4, where 1 is "not at all" and 4 is "completely," could you tell me how much you think each government is capable of solving problems in Mizoram?

E.2 Job Training

One question regarding our results is whether our treatment effects are due to unrelated aspects of the training program itself (e.g., such as social interactions with other participants) rather than subjects' improved economic prospects. As stated in the paper, our job training program does not appear to be particularly unusual in the local context. More than one-third of our control group attended a similar training program offered by an alternate training firm, and many more had attended similar programs in the past. To probe this question further, we tested whether job training attendance was predictive of our key outcomes in two ways: (1) within the control group, and (2) within the treatment group, controlling for actually migrating. These tests are not causally-identified, but we control for our standard battery of pre-treatment demographics (age, gender, employment status, marriage status, education level, and scheduled tribe status) and the pre-treatment measure of each outcome variable. We do not see any evidence that training has any significant effect on the primary outcomes. These tests were not pre-registered, and we view them as exploratory and suggestive non-experimental investigations.

Table E.22: Effect of Job Training on Key Outcomes (Control Group)

	Dependent variable:			
	Econ. Status	Life Planning	Confidence	Redist. Attitudes
Attended Training	0.025	0.028	0.116	0.198
	(0.174)	(0.178)	(0.187)	(0.187)
Pre-Econ. Status	0.582***			
	(0.128)			
Pre-Life Planning		0.488***		
		(0.116)		
Pre-Confidence			−0.032	
			(0.141)	
Pre-Attitudes				0.040
				(0.082)
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	118	103	116	117

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Pre-treatment controls: age, gender, employment status, marriage status, education level, and scheduled tribe status.

Table E.23: Effect of Job Training on Key Outcomes (Treatment Group)

	Dependent variable:			
	Econ. Status	Life Planning	Confidence	Redist. Attitudes
Attended Training	0.038	0.015	0.063	−0.301
	(0.246)	(0.271)	(0.221)	(0.238)
Migrated	1.404***	0.280	0.448*	0.246
	(0.293)	(0.332)	(0.259)	(0.284)
Pre-Econ. Status	0.410*			
	(0.208)			
Pre-Life Planning		0.847***		
		(0.171)		
Pre-Confidence			0.360**	
			(0.171)	
Pre-Attitudes				0.004
				(0.109)
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	127	118	122	126

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Pre-treatment controls: age, gender, employment status, marriage status, education level, and scheduled tribe status.

E.3 Comparing Effects among Likely Migrants and Non-Migrants

Was this shift primarily about migration, or about economic opportunities that the program gave all participants in the program? To answer this question, we examined how attitudes toward redistribution changed among likely migrants and likely non-migrants. While all treatment group individuals were offered the chance to migrate overseas, some demographic groups were more likely than others to actually do so if given the opportunity. We find that even among individuals who were very unlikely to migrate, the treatment still had a significant effect on redistribution preferences. In other words, the mere exit option of overseas employment appears to have shifted political views.

To identify those likely (and unlikely) to migrate if selected, we conducted an analysis in two steps using a machine-learning algorithm called Bayesian Additive Regression Trees (BART), included in the pre-analysis plan. First, we used BART to identify which pre-treatment characteristics (from the baseline survey) best predicted an individual's decision to migrate among the treatment group. Second, we used this model to identify the individuals in both the treatment

Table E.24: Main Effects: Likely Migrants vs. Likely Non-Migrants

	Effect Size		
	Likely Migrants	***Likely Non-Migrants***	*Difference*
Migrated Overseas	+ .59	+ .06	.53
	(.07)	(.04)	(.08)
Economic Standing	+ 1.12	+ .35	.77
	(.29)	(.18)	(.34)
Redistribution Attitudes	+ .49	+ .29	.20
	(.27)	(.17)	(.32)
N	68	180	

Note: Each row comes from an OLS regression of treatment (with an interaction term by respondent group) on the index of each outcome variable.

and control groups who most resembled the migrants in the treatment group. For example, men in our sample were far more likely to migrate, so they received higher propensity scores on average. This resulted in two subgroups based on pre-treatment covariates: "likely migrants," of whom 59% migrated if selected for the program, and "likely non-migrants," of whom just 6% migrated if selected. We then test the effect of the main treatment (selection to the program) within each subgroup. Unlike the comparisons in a standard mediation analysis, these comparisons are each causally identified, although the difference between the two comparisons is not.

First, the results (Table E.24) show that while most of the economic benefits appear to be driven by migration itself, likely non-migrants also benefited from receiving the opportunity to migrate. Among the likely migrants, the treatment had a large effect on economic standing: more than one standard deviation measured by the index, more than three times as large as for the likely non-migrants. Nevertheless, in the likely non-migrant group, the treatment still had a sizable and statistically significant effect: providing merely the opportunity to move overseas still paid economic dividends. This result is mirrored in the observational data. Among those who remained in Mizoram, employed individuals in the treatment group were earning significantly higher wages (15,700 INR [approx 200 USD] per month) than those in the control group (10,100 INR [125 USD] per month).

Second, the treatment had a large effect on the political opinions of those who were unlikely to move as well as those who were likely to move. Despite having considerably lower economic gains from the treatment, likely non-migrants still became significantly less supportive of taxation and redistribution if selected for the program, and the difference between the treatment effect in the two subgroups is not statistically significant. These results suggest that the mere option to migrate shaped individuals' attitudes toward taxation and redistribution—even for those who did not migrate. This result, too, is reflected in observational comparisons. Even among those who remained in Mizoram, individuals in the treatment group held views that were significantly more fiscally conservative—nearly 0.3 standard deviations in our index.

F Multiple Comparisons Analysis

As specified in the pre-analysis plan, we also provide a Benjamini-Hochberg false discovery rate analysis for the main pre-registered hypotheses—besides the primary hypothesis related to

international migration, which was listed separately. The below analysis uses a conservative false discovery rate of $Q < .05$. The analysis largely confirms the main results of the paper. The correction confirms that the main featured hypotheses at the endline reported in the manuscript all fall below the threshold for false discovery rate. The treatment effect on future confidence at the endline meets neither the $p < .05$ threshold nor the adjusted B-H threshold, which is somewhat unsurprising given that the treatment group had already experienced significant economic gains (unlike at the midline survey, where the effect passed both thresholds). The PAP also included one other hypothesis which we did not include in the paper: that the treatment group would be more likely to say that they were satisfied with their economic situation compared to a year before. We did not include this hypothesis because the wording was accidentally awkward given that the treatment group would have already realized substantial economic gains a year before the endline survey. The treatment group did express more current economic satisfaction, but the difference was relatively small and statistically insignificant.

Table F.25: Benjamini-Hochberg Correction

	P-Value	*Target*
(H2): Material Economic Status	.000	.01
(H2c): Marriage & Family Decisions	.001	.02
(H2d): Views on Redistribution	.005	.03
(H2b): Future Economic Confidence	.090	.04
(H2a): Current Economic Satisfaction	.172	.05

Pre-analysis plan hypothesis numbers in parentheses.

G Representatitiveness and External Validity

How might the effects in our sample generalize to other populations of migrants and different contexts? We begin by probing how our experimental sample compares to other samples of overseas migrants in India and Asia. Next, we evaluate external validity concerns by considering whether treatment effects might vary across different populations and contexts, what Egami and Hartman (2022) term "X-validity" and "C-validity" concerns, respectively.

G.1 Representativeness

To what degree is our experimental sample and context representative of migration from India, the world's largest source of emigrants? In this section, we characterize India's overseas migrant population using data in the Kerala Migration Study (KMS), a comprehensive household survey of the South Indian state of Kerala that has some of India's highest historic rates of out-migration, and overseas migrants in the Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS), a nationally representative survey of Indian citizens. We do so to assess the extent to which our sample conforms to the demographic traits of the country's overseas migrant population. Additionally, we analyze data from the World Values Survey (Round 7), which is one of the few existing nationally representative global surveys that collects information regarding the immigration status of respondents, and the countries of origin for immigrants.

We first compare the profiles of migrants involved in overseas migration and non-migrants. Across both the KMS and IHDS datasets, cross-border migrants are younger, more likely to belong to minority and historically disadvantaged religions, and more likely to have higher educational qualifications than non-migrants (see Table G.26). Similar to subjects in our study, overseas migrants from Kerala are considerably more likely than non-migrants to have completed secondary education (75 vs 52 percent). This is also true in the IHDS data: overseas migrants from India are 10 percentage points more likely to have completed high school than the general population. Kerala migrants are also significantly more likely to hail from religious minority communities compared to non-migrants (64 vs 45 percent). The IHDS data similarly shows that 26 percent of overseas Indian migrants are Muslim or Christian, compared to the population-wide Muslim or Christian rate of 16 percent. Finally, like in our study, overseas migrants in both the KMS and IHDS data were younger than the average non-migrant.

Table G.26: Characteristics of Overseas Migrants in IHDS and KMS

	IHDS		KMS	
	Gen. Pop.	Overseas Migrants	Gen. Pop.	Overseas Migrants
Age <30	0.57	0.36	0.46	0.81
Age: 31-50	0.25	0.60	0.28	0.19
Age >50	0.18	0.04	0.26	0.01
Male	0.50	0.95	0.47	0.86
At least 10th Standard Educ.	0.23	0.32	0.52	0.75
Minority Religion	0.16	0.26	0.45	0.64

IHDS and KMS asks different questions about migrant's age. While IHDS asks about the current age of migrant household members, KMS asks about age at first migration.

We next assess whether key contextual factors in our study are common in broader out-migration flows from India and Asia. Our study focused on migration from India to autocratic countries in the Persian Gulf. The KMS data provides a breakdown of the destination countries of overseas migrants; as Appendix Figure G.6 shows, the top 6 destination countries for Kerala's migrants are GCC countries, and migrants to these countries far outnumber migrants to democracies such as the United States and United Kingdom. Additionally, the KMS data shows that the average number of return migrants per household was more than half the average number of migrants per household, indicating that circular migration, like in our study, is common in the Kerala context. This is also true of the IHDS data, which shows that the average overseas migrant from India returned home after 20 months, similar to our study.

Figure G.6: Destination Countries of Kerala Migrants



Kerala Migration Survey Round (2013)

These patterns are corroborated in the WVS data. As Appendix Figure G.7a shows, significant proportions of immigrants from India tend to reside in autocratic nations, as defined by the Varieties of Democracy database. This data actually understates the proportion living in autocratic states because WVS excludes most Gulf states, which are the most common destination for Indian migrants. Appendix Figure G.7b, which considers immigrants from Asia as a whole, shows that more immigrants from Asia reside in autocratic nations than in democratic nations.

Figure G.7: Immigrants, by Political System of Destination Countries



(a) Immigrants from India

(b) Immigrants from Asia

Taken together, analyses of existing datasets on overseas migrants reveals that although our experimental sample is far from representative of India's general population, it generalizes to India's overseas migrant population with respect to age, minority status, and educational qualifications.

Additionally, key contextual factors in our study, such as migration to autocracies and circular migration, feature commonly in broader cross-border patterns in India and Asia.

G.2 External Validity by Sample (X-Validity)

"X-validity" concerns relate to the idea that the composition of subjects in experimental samples often varies from those in target populations (Egami and Hartman 2022). The subjects in our study were relatively young, educated, low-income, and largely hailed from minority backgrounds. How might the findings from this sample generalize to other population groups? It is plausible, for example, that less educated or older individuals may still remain pro-redistribution even as young educated individuals became more anti-redistribution.

We investigated X-validity concerns empirically by testing for heterogeneous effects within the sample to assess potential effects outside of the sample. First, we examine pairwise interactions between pre-treatment covariates and our key outcomes: individual and household redistribution attitudes and economic standing (Table G.27). We find no evidence that the treatment effects interacted with any of the demographic covariates we collected, or with baseline measures of economic standing.

Table G.27: Pairwise Heterogeneous Effects

	Redistribution Views	HH Redistribution Views	Economic Standing
Age	-0.11	-0.43	1.28
Gender	0.82	-0.84	1.81
Education	-0.35	-1.35	0.10
Scheduled Tribe	-0.90	-0.18	1.11
Christian	-0.97	0.36	1.47
Employed (Baseline)	-0.13	0.35	0.60
Wages (Baseline)	0.01	0.21	-0.33
Family Income (Baseline)	0.14	-0.37	-0.92
Assets (Baseline)	-0.43	-0.04	0.96

T-Statistics of pairwise interaction terms between treatment and key covariates for each main outcome.

Second, we used machine-learning estimators to investigate heterogeneity agnostically, following Devaux and Egami (2022), which proposes estimating individual-level treatment effects for all individuals in the sample based on estimates of the heterogenous effects of the treatment using all pre-treatment covariates. The results, presented in Appendix Figure G.8, generally show very little systematic heterogeneity in the treatment effects. Taken together, these two sets of findings suggest that the effects we observe of migration on the redistribution attitudes of migrants and their families are likely to extend to individuals from other socio-economic and demographic groups.

Figure G.8: Estimated Treatment Effects for Each Subject



Predicted treatment effects for each individual in our sample, estimated using **`exr`** *package (CRAN). Machine-learning algorithm estimates heterogeneity of treatment effect using all pre-treatment covariates, then predicts treatment effect for each unit.*

G.3 External Validity by Context (C-Validity)

"C-validity" concerns question whether experimental results based on one context can generalize to other contexts (Egami and Hartman 2022). Would our findings from Indian migrants working in the Gulf hospitality industry generalize to other industries, other origin countries, and other destination countries? C-validity concerns are very difficult to address empirically with only one context. Due to constraints stemming from resources, logistical capabilities, ethical considerations, and policy environments, we were unable to replicate our study in other cross-border migration contexts; indeed, the intensive and focused nature of our efforts were necessary to successfully induce migration in contrast to the null effects on migration interventions reported in prior work (Beam, McKenzie, and Yang 2016).

Nevertheless, based on insights gleaned from theory and fieldwork, we propose a set of key site-level, contextual factors that potentially moderate the effects of overseas migration. In Appendix Table G.28, we hypothesize the effect of migration on redistribution attitudes in a range of different migration contexts, and offer suggestions for research designs that can be employed in future work seeking to study the effects of migration in these alternate contexts. For example, we conjecture that the effect of migration on redistribution attitudes may be smaller in industries with lower average wages and greater exploitation, such as construction or domestic work, may be significantly smaller than those observed in this context. Given that our evidence suggest the results are driven by migrants' greater economic opportunities and independence, industries with less favorable opportunities should see smaller effects. The results are likely to be more similar in relatively high-paying industries like health care and retail.

Table G.28: Key Contextual Factors, Predicted Effects, and Suggested Designs

Context	**Hypothesized Effect on Redistribution Attitudes**	**Suggested Research Designs**
Lower-paying industries	Smaller anti-redistribution effects because of smaller effects on income and financial independence	Comparing effects of visa lotteries for higher-paying industries (health care, hospitality) and lower-paying industries (construction, domestic work).
More exploitative migration corridors	Smaller anti-redistribution effects because of smaller or negative effects on financial security.	Comparing effects of visa lotteries for destination countries with less exploitation and those with greater exploitation.
Longer-term migration	Larger anti-redistribution effect because migrants develop longer-term horizons and invest in host society integration	Comparing effects of migration in countries that permit longer-term versus shorter-term employment contracts.
Destination country with higher taxes	Smaller anti-redistribution effect because migrants may observe efficacy of taxation and redistribution in alleviating poverty	Comparing effects of visa lotteries to otherwise similar countries with more and less generous welfare states.
Destination country with less generous welfare state	Larger anti-redistribution effect because migrants may observe efficacy of smaller government in stimulating growth	Comparing effects of visa lotteries to otherwise similar countries with more and less generous welfare programs.
Origin region with higher taxes	Larger anti-redistribution effect because migrants may be more sensitive to concerns about taxation of their overseas financial gains	Comparing effects of visa lotteries from higher and lower tax regions within India.

This list of contextual factors is not intended to be exhaustive; additional theoretical and empirical work is needed to ascertain whether and in which direction contextual elements condition the effects of migration. The study sites and research designs that we have proposed delineate avenues for future research seeking to investigate whether and how context matters for the effect of migration on migrant attitudes.

G.4 Trends in Scholarship on Migration

Scholarship on migration has largely focused on migration to the Global North. In order to assess overall patterns, we examined every migration-related article from the last ten years of publications (2014-2023) from five leading journals in political science and international relations.[106]

[106]We examined *American Political Science Review*, *American Journal of Political Science*, *Journal of Politics*, *International Organization*, and *Comparative Political Studies*.

Reviewing each study's research design and data, we categorized the primary origin and destination countries of the migration flow, as well as the primary research focus of the article. The results are striking: Of the 122 articles we identified, 100 (82%) focus on migration to the Global North—nearly all to North America or Western Europe. By contrast, just 11 (9%) featured migration to Global South countries. In addition, seven of these 11 are narrowly focused on flows of refugees and asylum-seekers, a tiny fraction of migrants in the Global South. In other words, just 4 articles centered on the approximately 100 million other South-South migrants United-Nations:2024. This focus on the Global North is related to a broader focus on the politics of receiving communities: nearly 70% of the migration articles focused on native responses to immigration rather than the attitudes or behavior of migrants or sending communities. In our analysis, we found just two articles on the behavior of non-refugee migrants in the Global South or on their sending communities EscribaFolch:2018, Blair:2022.

Table G.29: Migrants' Destination Regions in Political Science Articles

		Recent Articles	
Destination Region	Migrant Population	On Migration	On Migrants
Global North	153 million (56%)	100 (82%)	23 (77%)
Global South	119 million (44%)	11 (9%)	4 (13%)
Mixed / Worldwide	—	11 (9%)	3 (10%)

Sources: United Nations 2024, Authors' analysis

Appendix References

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